Discovery and Experts under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedureq by Long, Jeremiah M.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 39 Number 4 
10-1-1964 
Discovery and Experts under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedureq 
Jeremiah M. Long 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jeremiah M. Long, Discovery and Experts under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedureq, 39 Wash. L. Rev. 
665 (1964). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol39/iss4/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 39 OCTOBER 1964 NUMBER 4
DISCOVERY AND EXPERTS
UNDER THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
JERE MAH M LONG*
The problem of delineating the boundaries of discovery under Rules
26-37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is constant, for the
language of limitation in the rules themselves remains vague. The dis-
cretionary nature of these rules suggests determination of each case on
its own record;' The burden so imposed on district judges and the lack
of definite standards in the rules themselves governing the exercise of
discretion have undoubtedly contributed to the adoption by many
judges of rather inflexible ancillary rules for the application of discov-
ery in questionable areas.2 One of these areas concerns the extent to
which expert witnesses' are subject to the discovery rules.'
* Member, Massachusetts and Washington bars. Partner, Broz, Long & Mikkelborg,
Seattle, Washington.
I judge Kirkpatrick in United States v. Kohler Co., 9 F.R.D. 289 (E.D. Pa. 1949)
said at 291:
There is nothing mandatory about the discovery provisions of the Rules. On the
contrary, the purpose and intent is evident throughout to leave their application
to the discretion of the trial court-not, of course, an absolute discretion but one
controlled and governed, not only by statutory enactments and the well established
rules of the common law, but also by considerations of policy and of necessity,
propriety and expediency in the particular case at hand.
2 Armstrong, Report of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure Recommending Amendments, 5 F.R.D. 339, 354-5 (1946). Cf. Leszynski v.
Russ, 29 F.R.D. 10 (D. Md. 1961).
8 For present purposes, an expert may be defined as one who, by study, training,
or experience in a particular subject or in a particular field, has acquired a knowledge
and an ability to deduce conclusions in regard to matters connected therewith which
are not generally possessed. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 557 (3rd ed. 1940); 7 id., § 1923;
20 Am. JuR. Evidence § 783 (1938).
The nature of the expert information sought in the cases considered was chemical,
medical, appraisal, engineering and accounting. Although the distinction is of ques-
tionable significance, the experts involved had professional experience, i.e., something
more than minimum qualifications.
I This question is generally considered as part of the larger problem of the limits
of discovery into matters of trial preparation which has been a matter of controversy
since the rules were adopted. See authority cited note 2 supra. Taine, Discovery of
Trial Preparations in the Federal Courts, 50 COLUm. L. REy. 1026, 1026 (1950) states,
"The question of the extent to which discovery of the trial preparations of an adverse
party is to be permitted in federal court litigation has been one of the most vexing
problems with which the courts have been confronted since the enactment in 1938
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure!'
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As a general proposition, the federal courts have seldom held that
the discovery rules applied to experts or have confined such application
of these rules to extremely narrow areas of expert information.' The
bases for such decisions are found outside the rules themselves and
proceed either from considerations prompted by the interference such
discovery may cause with trial preparation or by the view that discov-
ery extends only to facts.
It is submitted that neither of the above bases nor those corollary to
them can withstand close scrutiny. Discovery was intended, among
other purposes, as an issue formulation mechanism. It can not effec-
tively perform this function if pre-trial mutual knowledge is not ex-
tended beyond facts at least to opinions and the support for such opin-
ions which will be offered as evidence. Moreover, although the possi-
bility of unreasonable interference with trial preparation may exist in
the application of discovery to expert information, such possibility
can usually be eliminated by delaying such discovery until all parties
have obtained expert assistance and by imposing conditions or limita-
tions upon it.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
Implicit in the discovery rules' is the principle that mutual know-
ledge of all relevent evidence and issues prior to trial' is essential to the
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of litigation,' unless such
knowledge is sought in bad faith' or its acquisition unduly annoys, em-
barrasses or oppresses a party or witness." The rules presuppose"
that such knowledge affords the opportunity to intelligently evaluate a
case for settlement and to agree on matters not in dispute, thereby
disposing of a controversy without trial or shortening a trial so that
5 See Winner, Procedural Methods to Attain Discovery, 28 F.R.D. 97, 101-03
(1962).
6 FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
7 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
8 FED. R. Civ. P. 1 charges that the rules "...shall be construed to secure the just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."
9 FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d).
10Id. 30(b) and (d).
11 Empirical statistics do not exist to show that litigants prior to the adoption of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or in those jurisdictions which have no discovery
or limited discovery suffer by fewer settlements, longer trials, or the more frequent
prevalence of falsity, nor can conclusive data be assembled to demonstrate that broad
discovery increases settlements, shortens trials, or enhances the likelihood that truth
rather than falsity will prevail. See Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 997 (2nd
Cir. 1942) aff'd 318 U.S. 109 (1943). Moore, however, has stated, "[I]t cannot be
doubted that the full and equal mutual discovery in advance of trial provided for
by the Rules has increased the efficiency of the administration of justice in federal
courts." 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE R 26.02 (2d ed. 1950).
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only the real issues are litigated; for protection against unfair surprise,
because discovery is considered the means to detect and expose false
claims, defenses, and evidence and to record testimony while memory
is fresh and preserve it in the event a witness dies or leaves the juris-
diction, thereby minimizing the injustice inherent in delay of trial.12
Discovery extends to any person 3 and any matter not privileged
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in litigation, whether
or not the disclosure would be admissible at trial, so long as the dis-
closure sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence1 The court has the power, upon good cause
shown, to make any order which justice requires to protect a party or
witness from annoyance, embarrassment or oppression." During the
taking of a deposition, the court may terminate examination or limit its
scope upon a showing that it is being conducted in bad faith. Con-
versely, if a deponent refuses to answer any question propounded on
oral examination, a motion may be made to compel an answer.
The principal phrases of limitation upon discovery are, "relevant
to the subject matter involved in litigation,"" "reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,"' 9 "bad faith, 20 "un-
reasonably to annoy, embarrass or oppress,"'" and "good cause.""2
These are broad and vague, without definition in the rules nor ade-
quately defined in the cases. By their very nature, they are perhaps
indefinable." The problems presented in giving meaning to these terms
require a pragmatic exercise of discretion without yielding to a doc-
12 See 6 WiGmoR, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 1845-63 and 4 MooRn, op. cit. supra
note 11, 26.02.
13 FED. R. Cirv. P. 26(a).
14 FED. .Civ. P. 26(b).
This provision governs not only the scope of depositions upon oral examination and
written interrogatories under rules 30 and 31, but also the scope of interrogatories to
parties under rule 33 and the scope of discovery and production of documents ... under
rule 34. 2 BARaoN & HOLTzOFF, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE AND PROCEDURE § 646 (1951).
15 FED. K_ Civ. P. 30 (b).
IG FED. K, Civ. P. 30 (d).
17 FED. . Civ. P. 37(a).
Is FED. K Cv. P. 26(b).
1g Ibid.
2o FED. KL Crv. P. 30(d).
21 Ibid.
22 FED. K. Civ. P. 30(b), 34.
23 "What constitutes 'good cause' under Rule 34 necessarily turns on the facts and
circumstances of each particular case, and in the last analysis rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court." Harlan, J., dissenting in United States v. Proctor and
Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 686 (1958).
Compare Judge Layton's opinion in E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 23 F.R.D. 237 (D. Del. 1959), with judge Kirkpatrick's opinion upon
reconsideration of the same case. 24 F.KD. 416 (D. Del. 1959). See also United
Air Lines, Inc. v. United States, 26 F.P.D. 213 (D. Del. 1960).
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trinaire absolutism permitting unrestrained discovery in every instance
or to a formalism denying discovery on technical grounds or on the
basis of a priori principles which make discovery an empty gesture.
Appellate courts cannot instill much stability and certainty, for appli-
cation of these rules has been left to each district judge's discretion. 4
Adequate power, however, to effect mutual prior disclosure of evidence
and examination of issues in good faith and to cope with attempted
abuses of discovery which may result in annoyance, embarrassment or
oppression to a party or witness, is lodged with the district judges. 5
The rules make a clear distinction between the right to discovery
and the right to use information discovered at trial. 6 The burden"
therefore rests upon the one seeking to prevent disclosure to satisfy the
court that there is ground for so doing, 2 -- except when examination
of documents is sought, where the burden is then upon the party seek-
ing such discovery to show good cause for an intrusion into private
files and records." Discovery is much broader in its scope than exam-
ination permitted at trial." This was a major change from prior dis-
covery practice." The present rules remove restrictions upon taking
24 When a discovery issue does reach an appellate court, it concerns whether the
trial court's action was an abuse of discretion, not the appropriateness of the order.
Tiedman v. American Pigment Corporation, 253 F.2d 803, 808 (4th Cir. 1958); Bank
of America National Trust and Savings Association v. Hayden, 231 F.2d 595 (9th Cir.
1956). Cf. Cleary Bros. v. Christie Scow Corp., 176 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1949). In
United States v. Proctor and Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 681 (1958), however, Mr. Justice
Douglas stated, "On the merits we have concluded that 'good cause,' as used in Rule 34,
was not established" where appellees sought a transcript of grand jury proceedings.
The dissent by Mr. Justice Harlan, joined in by Justices Frankfurter and Burton,
pointed out at 685, "The Court reverses the judgment below without so much as
adverting to what seems to me the real and only question in the case: Did the district
court abuse its discretim by ordering the government to furnish the appellees with the
transcript of the grand jury proceedings?"
25 4 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 11.
26 3 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, op. cit. supra note 14, § 295. See Pike & Willis, The New
Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure, 38 COLUM. L. REv. 1179 (1938).
27 In United Air Lines, Inc., v. United States, 26 F.R.D. 213 (D. Del. 1960),
Wright, C. J., said at 217:
The court's decision ... ultimately is no more than a comparative evaluation of
competing claims of need and prejudice. But to inject notions of burden of
persuasion into an analysis of such a subjective nature is to create a disparity in
legal standards between 26 and 34, a result contrary to the language and philo-
sophy of the discovery rules.
28 See authorities cited note 26 supra. See also Teller v. Montgomery Ward, 27 F.
Supp. 938 (E.D. Pa. 1939).
29 "Examination into a person's files and records, ... must be judged with care. It
is not without reason that various safeguards have been established to preclude un-
warranted excursions into the privacy of a man's work. At the same time, public policy
supports reasonable and necessary inquiries. Properly to balance these competing
interests is a delicate and difficult task." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 497 (1947).
30 State of Md. ex. rel. Montvila v. Pan American Bus Lines, Inc., 1 F.R.D. 213
(D. Md. 1940).




depositions and discovery generally, but retain restrictions upon use
during trial of information discovered."2
Although the discovery rules provide an integrated procedural
device,"3 decisions under one rule are not necessarily applicable to
proceedings under another, and failure to proceed under one rule
rather than another may be important or decisive.3 4 However, the
cases dealing with experts and discovery, other than those concerned
principally with the question of good cause when experts' reports were
sought, have been decided without regard to the procedural device
utilized. The issue in the cases dealing with experts has been tendered
to the courts in a number of different procedural ways, e.g., motion for
production of an expert's report under rule 34;11 objections to inter-
rogatories under rule 33; 36 motion to vacate notice of taking an expert's
deposition with and without 8 a motion to quash a subpoena duces
tecum issued under rule 45 requiring production of an expert's report;
motion to limit examination under rule 30(b);" motion to terminate
examination under rule 30(d) ;40 and motion under rule 37 to compel
answers on oral deposition.4'
Since the rules themselves place no limitation of general application
upon discovery beyond the requirement of relevancy and the restriction
32 See authority cited supra note 31.3s Hawaiian Airlines v. Trans-Pacific Airlines, 8 F.R.D. 449, 451 (D. Hawaii 1949).
84 Cf. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 505-506 (1947).
5 E.g., United States v. Five Cases, 179 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1950) ; United States v.
900.57 Acres, 30 F.R.D. 512 (W.D. Ark. 1962); United Air Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 26 F.R.D. 213 (D. Del. 1960); United States v. Certain Parcels of Land,
25 F.R.D. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
The same requirements are applied where documents are sought under rule 34
and where a subpoena duces tecum is issued under rule 45 to compel the production of
documents on taking an oral deposition under rule 26. Continental Distilling Co. v.
Humphrey, 17 F.R.D. 237 (D.D.C. 1955).36 E.g., United States v. Nysco Laboratories, Inc., 26 F.R.D. 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1960);
E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.R.D. 416 (D. Del.
1959); American Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania Petroleum Products Co., 23 F.R.D. 680
(D.R.I. 1959).
87 E.g., United States v. 6.82 Acres of Land, etc., 18 F.R.D. 195 (D.N.M. 1955);
Continental Distilling Corp. v. Humphrey, 17 F.R.D. 237 (D.D.C. 1955).
8 3 .g., Dipson Theatres, Inc. v. Buffalo Theatres, Inc., 8 F.R.D. 313 (W.D.N.Y.
1948) ; United States v. 88 Cases of Bireley's Orange Beverage, 5 F.R.D. 503 (D.N.J.
1946); United States v. 720 Bottles Labeled 2 Fl. Oz., 3 F.R.D. 466 (E.D.N.Y. 1944).
3D E.g., United States v. 50.34 Acres, 12 F.R.D. 440 (E.D.N.Y. 1952).40 Russo v. Merck & Co., 21 F.R.D. 237 (D.R.I. 1957) ; McNenar v. N.Y., Chicago
& St. Louis R.R., 20 F.R.D. 598 (W.D. Pa. 1957); Beirne v. Fitch Sanitarium, 20
F.R.D. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Macrina v. Smith, 18 F.R.D. 254 (E.D. Pa. 1955).41 E.g., Sachs v. Aluminum Co. of America, 167 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948) ; Coxe v.
Putney, 26 F.R.D. 562 (E.D. Pa. 1961); United Air Lines, Inc. v. United States, 26
F.R.D. 213 (D. Del. 1960); E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 24 F.R.D. 416 (D. Del. 1959).
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arising from privilege, to conclude that denial or limitation of discovery
of experts proceeded from bad faith in seeking disclosure, or circum-
stances of annoyance, embarrassment or oppression in the particular
case before the court would be logical but erroneous. The issue in
almost every case, except where an expert's report was sought,4" has
been taken by the courts to concern whether the discovery rules
extend to experts, and if so, the scope of their application to experts
generally. 3 Many courts have adopted limitations of general appli-
cation, which have a particularly subverting effect in the area of expert
evidence inasmuch as the same results could have been reached in the
particular cases within the discretionary provisions of the rules. On the
other hand, some opinions have viewed discovery as simply advancing
the time of disclosure and have therefore permitted discovery of
expert opinions." No mention was made in such opinions whether the
circumstances of the particular cases involved bad faith or whether
annoyance, embarrassment or oppression to a party or witness would
result in the cases before the courts by permitting discovery. The
opinions range from allowing the deposition of an expert to be taken
concerning his conclusions"' to denying disclosure of the names of
experts employed by a party.46 Discovery of experts has been con-
sidered a vehicle for making use of an adversary's trial preparation
and has, therefore, been denied."' This reasoning is similar to that
42 Where experts' reports were sought, whether under rule 34 or when rule 45 has
been used with rule 26, the court has considered whether under the circumstances pre-
sented "good cause" was established and usually only incidentally touched upon the
general question of the scope of discovery as it applied to experts. See note 27 supra.
4 3 E.g., Judge Bootle in United States v. Certain Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 98 (M.D.
Ga. 1955), an eminent domain case where the government sought a protective order to
prevent the taking of an appraiser's deposition, said at 100, "The question for decision
boils down basically to the extent of discovery which will be ordere4 or permitted from
an adverse party's experts." See also United States v. 284,392 Square Feet of Floor
Space, 203 F. Supp. 75 (E.D.N.Y 1962); United States v. 88 Cases of Bireley's
Orange Beverage, 5 F.R.D. 503 (D.N.J. 1946) ; United States v. 720 Bottles Labeled
2 Fl. Oz., 3 F.R.D. 466 (E.D.N.Y. 1944).
44 E.g., Leding v. U.S. Rubber Co., 23 F.R.D. 220 (D. Mont. 1959) ; United States
v. 50.34 Acres, 13 F.R.D. 19 (E.D.N.Y. 1952); Bergstrom Paper Co. v. Continental
Ins. Co., 7 F.R.D. 548 (E.D. Wisc. 1947) (discovery denied on other grounds) ; United
States v. 300 Cans, 7 F.R.D. 36 (N.D. Ohio 1946).
45 E.g., Sachs v. Alcoa Aluminum Co. of America, 167 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948);
E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.R.D. 416 (D. Del.
1959) ; Russo v. Merck & Co., 21 F.R.D. 237 (D.R.I. 1957) ; Cold Metal Process Co.
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 425 (N.D. Ohio 1947).
46 United States v. 6.82 Acres, 18 F.R.D. 195 (D.N.M. 1955) ; Hickey v. United
States, 18 F.R.D. 88 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
4 E.g., United States v. Five Cases, 179 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1950) ; E. I. Dupont de
Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.R.D. 416 (D. Del. 1959) ; Carpenter-
Trant Drilling Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Corp., 23 F.R.D. 257 (D. Neb. 1959).
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upon which the so-called "work product" exception to discovery is
based. This exception has been extended by some courts to protect
experts from discovery.48 Considerations of fairness and policy pro-
ceeding at least in part from the expense of experts and from a concept
that a property right exists in expert evidence have been given as
reasons for excluding experts from the application of the discovery
rules except when disclosure was necessary to establish a party's case. 9
Some courts have taken the view that only facts are the subject of
discovery, not opinions and conclusions." Where experts' reports have
been sought, the courts have frequently refused to order production,
holding that no showing or an insufficient showing of good cause was
made.5 Those cases permitting discovery of experts have been based
on the view that since such testimony could be compelled at trial, it
can earlier be compelled by discovery.52 Phrased another way, dis-
covery simply advances the time of disclosure." Some courts have
permitted discovery of the factual data upon which an expert's con-
clusions were based but not of the conclusions themselves." One
court would permit discovery where an expert's fee has been tendered.5
Another opinion limited disclosure to counsel and technical experts.5
Other courts have allowed discovery of an expert employee of a party
4 8 E.g., United States v. 7,534.04 Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 146 (N.D. Ga. 1954) ;
Colonial Airlines v. Janas, 13 F.R.D. 199 (S.D.N.Y 1952); Schuyler v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 111 (M.D. Pa. 1950); Midland Steel Products Co. v. Clark
Equipment Co., 7 F.R.D. 132 (W.D. Mich. 1945); see Klein v. Leader Elec., 81 F.
Supp. 624 (N.D.N.Y 1948).
4 9 E.g., Carpenter-Trant Drilling Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Corp., 23 F.R.D. 257
(D. Neb. 1959); Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 84
(D. Mass. 1947) ; Cf. 4 MooRE, op. cit. sufra note 11, 126.24.
50 See cases cited in note 54 infra.
51 E.g., Carpenter-Trant Drilling Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Corp., 23 F.R.D. 257
(D. Neb. 1959) ; United States v. 6.82 Acres, 18 F.R.D. 195 (D.N.M. 1955) ; Schuyler
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 111 (M.D. Pa. 1950); United States v. Five
Cases, 9 F.R.D. 81 (D. Conn. 1949); Midland Steel v. Clark, 7 F.R.D. 132 (W.D.
Mich. 1945).52 E.g., Sachs v. Aluminum Co. of America, 167 F2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948) ; Cold
Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 425 (N.D. Ohio 1947) ; see
also United States v. 48 Jars, etc., 23 F.R.D. 192 (D.D.C. 1958) ; Russo v. Merck &
Co., 21 F.R.D. 237 (D.R.I. 1957) ; United States v. 50.34 Acres, etc., 12 F.R.D. 440
(E.D.N.Y 1952); Cf. Leding v. United States Rubber Co., 23 F.R.D. 220 (D. Mont.
1959).
5 3 E.g., Bergstrom Paper Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 7 F.R.D. 548 (E.D. Wisc.
1947).
"4E.g., United States v. 284,392 Sq. Ft. of Floor Space, 203 F. Supp. 75 (E.D.N.Y
1962) ; United States v. 19.897 Acres, 27 F.R.D. 420 (E.D.N.Y 1961) ; Walsh v. Rey-
nolds Metals Co., 15 F.R.D. 376 (D.N.J. 1945); United States v. Certain Parcels of
Land, 15 F.R.D. 224 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
55 United States v. 50.34 Acres, 13 F.R.D. 19 (E.D.N.Y 1952).
61 Melori Shoe Corp. v. Pierce & Stevens, Inc., 14 F.R.D. 346 (D. Mass. 1953).
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to the litigation. 7 Still other courts have allowed discovery in the area
of a party's expertise."
In large part, the irreconcilable results and the development of a
priori principles in discovery cases dealing with experts rests upon
a failure to appreciate the issue formulation purpose of discovery; the
necessity that the advantages of discovery must apply mutually; the
flexibility with which the rules should be applied and the authority
of the court to limit or condition discovery in each case so that prior
disclosure of evidence and formulation of the issues can be accomp-
lished in good faith, without annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression
to a party or witness. One suspects that resistance to change" and
fear of depending upon the predilections of each district judge in the
exercise of discretion, have developed on the part of some a preference
for the certainty of a rule excluding experts from discovery. In addi-
tion, there is a tendency to treat such preliminary matters without the
care and attention given trial matters. In any event, no sound body
of coherently related propositional law is deducible from the cases,
nor have general standards employed by various courts yet furnished
an adequate method of attack in this "hazy frontier of the discovery
process.""
MENTAL OR PHYSICAL CONDITION
Rule 35(a) requires upon a showing of good cause that a party
submit to a mental or physical examination when his mental or physical
condition is in issue.6 Rule 35(b) (1) provides that the party causing
the examination shall furnish a copy of a detailed written report of
the examining physician, setting out his findings and conclusions, if
requested by the party examined.62 After such request and delivery,
57 Kendall v. United Air Lines, Inc., 9 F.R.D. 702 (S.D.N.Y 1949); Moran v.
Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 6 F.R.D. 594 (W.D. Pa. 1947).
5s Coxe v. Putney, 26 F.R.D. 562 (E.D. Pa. 1961) ; Beirne v. Fitch Sanitarium, 2
F.R.D. 93 (S.D.N.Y 1957).
59 Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F2d 976 (2d Cir. 1942), aff'd 318 U.S. 109 (1943). In
United States v. 900.57 Acres, 30 F.R.D. 512 (WD. Ark. 1962) Miller, C.J., in sustain-
ing objections to interrogatories and denying a motion to produce appraisal reports,
said that discovery had not been sought in that district in an eminent domain case in
20 years and would be an "innovation."
60 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
61 That provision also contains the following:
The order may be made only on motion for good cause shown and upon notice
to the party to be examined and to all other parties and shall specify the time,
place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination and the person or persons
by whom it is to be made.
62 That provision also contains the following:
If the party examined refuses to deliver such report, the court on motion and
notice may make an order requiring delivery on such terms as are just, and if a
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the party causing the examination to be made is entitled upon request
to receive from the party examined a like report of any examination
previously or thereafter made of the same mental or physical condition.
Implicit in these provisions is recognition of the mutuality of discov-
ery."' Thus, the party whose mental or physical condition is not in
issue is entitled to the opportunity to ascertain the nature of the
physical condition in issue by examination." But the rule does not
stop at this point. It is not enough that all parties are afforded the
opportunity to learn about the physical or mental condition in issue.
The parties are entitled to know what the other side has learned of
the issues. This right is not absolute, however, because there may be
an encroachment on the physician-patient privilege. 5 Therefore, the
choice of whether the parties are to have the right to learn what each
other knows of the issue rests with the party having the privilege if
such privilege exists.
Rule 35(b) (2) recognizes that a physician-patient privilege may
exist unless it is waived by requesting and obtaining a report of
examination or by taking the examiner's deposition.66 Explicit in the
language of this provision is recognition of the right to take the deposi-
tion of the examiner. Presumably where the deposition of the examiner
is taken, the other parties to the litigation could take the deposition
of the examined party's physician." Although in actual practice in
physician fails or refuses to make such a report the court may exclude his testi-
mony if offered at the trial.
6s"The provision [Rule 35(b)] contemplates a full mutuality of disclosure." 7
Cyc. FED. Pao. § 25.703 (3d ed. 1951).
6t 2 BARRo 1 & HoLTzoF, FmAL PRAcrIcE AwD Pnocmuan § 821 (1951) ; 4 MooRE,
FEDEAL Practice 35.06 (2d ed. 1950).
This provision has been held valid against a contention that it violates constitu-
tional rights of privacy and rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Thirteenth Amend-
ments to the Unifed States Constitution. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
"The Rule seems essential to prevent malingering and fraudulent testimony and
recovery thereon,..."' 7 Cyc. FED. PRo. § 25.678 (3d ed. 1951).
O5 Rule 35 is in derogation of a statutory privilege and should be strictly construed.
Sher v. DeHaven, 199 F.2d 777 (1952), cert. denied 345 U.S. 936 (1953); Beaning
v. Phelps, 249 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1957) ; Dulles v. Quan Yoke Fong, 237 F.2d 496 (9th
Cir. 1956) ; Fong Sik Leung v. Dulles, 226 F.2d 76 (9th Cir. 1955).
The courts are not agreed whether federal law or state law controls the issue of
privilege in various types of cases. Cf. 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, op. cit. supra note 64, §
651, at 320; 4 MooRE, op. cit. =upra note 64, 1111 2623 (9), 34.15; Leszynski v. Russ, 29
F.R.D. 10 (D. id. 1961).66FED. R. Civ. P. 35(b) (2) reads as follows:
By requesting and obtaining a report of the examination so ordered or by taking
the deposition of the examiner, the party examined waives any privilege he may
have in that action or any other involving the controversy, regarding the testimony
of every other person who has examined or may thereafter examine his in respect
of the same mental or physical condition.
See Commentary, 4 FED. RuLEs SEnv. 917 (1941).
07 There appear to be no cases on this point.
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personal injury cases, which comprise the large bulk of those in which
rule 35 is used,"8 the defendant usually obtains an examination of the
plaintiff voluntarily," the deposition of an examining physician is
seldom taken, 0 for the parties content themselves with exchanging
medical reports.7 ' Although counsel often feel dissatisfied with the
medical reports obtained in personal injury litigation, there apparently
are no reported decisions upon what is and what is not a "detailed
written report of the ... physician setting out his findings and con-
clusions."" 2
At least in litigation where the mental or physical condition of a
party is in issue and the principal witnesses on damages are experts,
the bench and bar actively operate under discovery."3 In principle,
however, since it involves a possible invasion of a privilege, there is
less reason to permit discovery than in anti-trust, condemnation, food
and drug, patent or other litigation, where the principal testimony is
or will be expert. One might assume that underlying the practical
results is recognition of the fact that a plaintiff in personal injury
litigation invariably has been medically examined prior to institution
of the suit. Therefore, when the defendant obtains a report from an
6 8 Wadlow v. Humbred, 27 F. Supp. 210 (W.D. Mo. 1939) would confine application
of rule 35 to personal injury cases where the mental or physical condition was directly
in controversy. The language of the rule, however, being unlimited, is not confined to
such suits. 7 CYc. FED. PRo. § 25.681 (3d ed. 1951). The Advisory Committee Note to
the 1955 Proposed Amendment to Rule 35(a), which amendment would specifically
provide its applicability where blood relationship is in issue and extend the application
of the rule to agents or persons under the custody or legal control of a party, states,
"The amendment also makes clear, by necessary implication, that examinations under
this role may be had in other than personal injury actions, contrary to what was said
in Wadlow v. HumUbred...."
69 It seems clear that a party should not be precluded from obtaining a report of
examination where he voluntarily submits to examination. 7 Cvc. FED. PRO. § 25.702
(3d ed. 1951). In this connection, the 1955 proposed amendment would clarify rule
35(b). The Note of the Advisory Committee to this proposed amendment states, "The
amendment is consistent with, and supplements, the line of cases which has held that a
party may proceed under Rule 35(b) to obtain a report of an examination of him by
his adversary's physician, even though he has submitted voluntarily to the examination,
rather than requiring an order under Rule 35(a). Keil v. Himes, 13 F.R.D. 451 (E.D.
Pa. 1952); Dumas v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 11 F.R.D. 496 (N.D. Ohio 1951); and
cases cited in 4 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, fr 35.06 n.1 (2d ed. 1950)."
70 This observation is based on experience. It has no documentary support.
71 Although the argument has apparently never been discussed in a reported decision,
it may be argued where an oral deposition was sought that a protective order might be
obtained either by the physician or the opposing party, limiting discovery to requiring
delivery of a written report on the ground that inasmuch as the information sought was
available in that form, to require the physician and opposing counsel to attend a
deposition would be annoying, oppressive or burdensome to either or both physician
and opposing party.72 FED. R. Crv. P. 35(b)(1).
73 See Winner, Procedural Methods to Attain Discovery, 28 F.R.D. 97, 101-03
(1962), and Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information,
14 STAN. L. REV. 455 (1962).
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examining physician, the parties are in a similar position with regard
to expert evidence, and were it not for the privilege where it exists,
the right to discover the other side's evidence would be completely
mutual. Where the privilege does not exist, the right to discover the
other side's evidence is available. Despite the privilege, however, dis-
covery of the other side's evidence normally occurs, for plaintiffs
waive their privilege and request copies of the medical reports of
examining physicians.71 Many plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys in
personal injury litigation recognize that more is to be gained by way
of intelligent settlement, better trial preparation and shorter trial time
by discovery, and little is to be lost by it, for both sides are in a similar
position."5 The same reasoning applicable to analysis of rule 35 in
practice has equal validity in anti-trust, patent, food and drug, con-
demnation, and other litigation where the parties intend to present
expert evidence at trial.76
INTERFERENCE WITH TRIAL PREPARATION
In denying discovery of expert information, many courts have ex-
pressly or impliedly rested their decisions upon: (1) an unwillingness
to permit one party to make use of another party's trial preparations;
(2) the view that it is unfair to permit such discovery unless necessary
to establish a party's case because of the expense of experts and/or
because of a desire to protect a property right, either of the party or
expert, in the the expert's opinion; and (3) an extension of the "work
product doctrine." These grounds will be discussed seriatim. They are
aspects of the more general position that such discovery would be an
unwarranted interference with trial preparation.
1. Making Use of an Opponent's Trial Preparation. This position
may be summarized as follows: Where the factual data upon which
an expert will base his opinions is available from other sources, it
" See authorities cited note 73 sitpra. However, Loulsell, Discovery and Pre-Trial
Under The Minnesota Rules, 36 MINx. L. REv. 633 (1952), states at 642, "the conse-
quences of plaintiff's discovery of the conclusions of defendants' physicians, are suffi-
ciently onerous to induce most plaintiffs' attorneys, except in unusual circumstances, to
refrain from such discovery."
75 It appears, however, that the practice is developing of plaintiffs' counsels refrain-
ing from taking the deposition of the examining physician or requesting a report of the
examining physician. There may be many reasons for plaintiffs' attorneys taking this
course of action and relying on privilege. It is submitted that a prime reason proceeds
from the inadequacy of medical reports received. A general report which contains
little or no detail can be valueless in appraising a case for settlement, narrowing the
issues, or even finding out the medical facts and has little value for purposes of cross-
examination.
76 See authorities cited supra note 73.
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can not be obtained from an adversary. To permit such discovery
would afford a party the opportunity to make use of an opponent's
trial preparation, thereby penalizing the diligent and placing a premium
on laziness. Inasmuch as any expert possessing the underlying facts
can reach his own conclusions, such discovery becomes an unwarranted
interference with trial preparation. This view appears to have origi-
nated with McCarthy v. Palmer." Judge Moscowitz said in that case:
While The Rules of Civil Procedure were designed to permit liberal
examination and discovery, they were not intended to be made the vehicle
through which one litigant could make use of his opponent's preparation
of his case. To use them in such a manner would penalize the diligent
and place a premium on laziness. It is fair to assume that, except in the
most unusual circumstances, no such result was intended.78
Although McCarthy v. Palmer did not involve a discovery issue,79 it
has often been cited and quoted" as determinative of discovery issues.
The reasoning quoted has been applied in discovery cases concerning
experts without regard to the posture of the case and without evalua-
tion of the circumstances surrounding the issue when presented.8 '
Thus, in United States v. 7534.04 Acres of Land,2 Chief Judge Hooper
sustained objections to interrogatories seeking the names of appraisers,
copies of appraisals, methods of appraisal and breakdown of valuation
in an eminent domain case, saying:
The land is open to inspection by all parties, no information concerning
the same is sought from the government that is not readily available to
the defendants. The information sought therefore is necessarily informa-
tion obtained by the government in preparation of the trial of the case
and in the opinion of this court is not obtainable by interrogatories. 3
7729 F. Supp. 585 (E.D.N.Y. 1939), aff'd 113 F2d 721 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 311
U.S., 680 (1940).
78 Id. at 586.
79 The case involved a personal injury. It was brought under the Railroad Retire-
ment Act of 1937. The discovery rules were but incidentally discussed in holding that
where the plaintiff inspected a document produced by the defendants after demand, the
document became admissible on behalf of the defendants even though the plaintiff
refused to place it in evidence.80 Taine, Discovery of Trial Preparation in the Federal Courts, 50 CoLum. L. REv.
1026, 1028 (1950), discusses the tremendous influence the quoted language has attained
and remarks upon the number of times it has been quoted.
s1 See United States v. 900.57 Acres, 30 F.R.D. 512 (W.D. Ark. 1962) ; United Air
Lines, Inc. v. United States, 26 F.R.D. 213 (D. Del. 1960) ; United States v. Certain
Parcels of Land, 25 F.R.D. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1959) ; United States v. 7,543.04 Acres, 18
F.R.D. 146 (N.D. Ga. 1954); Colonial Airlines v. Janas, 13 F.R.D. 199 (S.D.N.Y
1952) ; Schuyler v. United Air Lines, 10 F.R.D. 111 (M.D. Pa. 1950) ; Midland Steel
Products Co. v. Clark Equipment Co., 7 F.R.D. 132 (W.D. Mich. 1943).
82 18 F.R.D. 146 (N.D. Ga. 1954).
18 Id. at 146.
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Similarly, in Colonial Airlines v. Janas," a suit to recover for the di-
version and improper expenditure of corporate funds, wherein the
defendants sought production of a public accountant's report based
on examination of the books and records of Colonial Airlines, it was
held that no good cause was shown under rule 34 because Colonial
Airlines was willing to allow an inspection of the books and records
upon which the report was based. Judge Goddard expressly stated
that a party ought not obtain by discovery the results of his adversary's
trial preparation. 5
The defendant generally will be in a position to exploit a plaintiff's
trial preparation if unlimited discovery of experts is permitted, for in
the usual case where experts are involved, a plaintiff's suit will be
based in whole or in part upon an expert's opinions. If the defendant
has no expert at the time suit is filed, the possibility exists that a party
sued could retain an attorney who by interrogatories under rule 33
would obtain the names of the plaintiff's experts. Thereafter, without
limitation upon such discovery, the plaintiff's experts could be deposed
under rule 26, to ascertain not only their conclusions but every factor
considered and every assumption, theory, test, evaluation, method,
comparison, and judgment used or made. The deposing party then
could hire an expert to advise him upon the merits of the deposition
testimony of his adversary's experts, saving considerable expense in
determining whether to settle or proceed to trial. In such a situation,
discovery becomes a vehicle to take unfair advantage of another's trial
preparation. It is annoying, embarrassing, and oppressive.
An even greater fear exists in the circumstances outlined. It pro-
ceeds from the obvious distrust with which courts, juries, laymen, and
attorneys view expert testimony.8 Where discovery would permit one
party to obtain another's expert evidence before hiring his own expert,
the fear exists that an accommodation expert may agree with portions
of the adversary's expert testimony but draw different conclusions to
support his employer's position or use different tests or methods or
make any one or more changes in areas where there can be little
support beyond expert judgment. In other words, either intentionally
8413 F.R.D. 199 (S.D.N.Y 1952).
sr Id. at 200.86 This observation has been frequently pointed out. The reasons for this distrust
are discussed in 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 563 (3d ed. 1940). Much of the literature on
the subject is collected, id. 645 n2. 2 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN §




or subconsciously through partisanship, incompetence or dishonesty,
manufacture counter evidence." Where experts are concerned, the
risk of false testimony, whether intentional, careless or simply error,
may be considered sufficiently greater than with other evidence in
general so as to warrant excluding such testimony from discovery
mainly because the sanctions of perjury, which tend to compel truthful
testimony, are as a practical matter not applicable to expert opinion."
There is an additional consideration which weighs against discovery
in the area of experts. It proceeds from the fact that a party is not
bound by an expert's opinions unless and until that expert is called as
a witness and testifies during a trial. Therefore, if an expert does not
hold up on cross-examination during a deposition, or if a party does not
want to risk impeachment of an expert during trial based upon an
earlier deposition, the particular expert need not be called as a witness.
Another expert not under the same handicap could be retained and
called as a witness during trial. With this risk in mind, a holding pre-
cluding discovery into the area of expert information would appear
justified.
These views, going beyond the language of the cases, have seldom
been articulated but are at least subconsciously present 9 when discov-
ery is denied on the ground that it permits a party to make use of an
87 This reason against discovery generally, i.e., fear of manufactured counter evi-
dence, is analyzed in 6 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 86, § 1845.
In a sense, expert evidence generally is manufactured for each particular case.
Where an automobile accident occurs, for example, the witnesses are limited generally
to those who know of it through their senses. There is, however, no similar limitation
upon the number of persons who may make a study upon which expert testimony is to
be based. United Air Lines, Inc. v. United States, 26 F.R.D. 213, 217 (D. Del. 1960).
In addition, the factors underlying the expert's conclusions are not limited in time to a
momentary occurrence, for the expert may draw upon experience, studies previously
made by himself or others, and tests conducted for the specific purpose of evidence.
88 2 ORGEL, op cit supra note 86, § 247, at 261, states, "The partisan character of
expert or opinion testimony is, of course, obvious and this is emphasized by the fact
that an expert witness may usually escape the consequences of an excessive zeal for the
interests of his employer by pointing out that he is testifying to his 'opinion' and not to
'facts'."
89 In part, this fear helps explain the race to first discover, and because of the
nature of expert testimony this fear is heightened. It has been pointed out in Comment,
Tactical Use And Abuse of Depositions Under The Federal Rules, 59 YALE L.J. 117,
134 (1950) that:
The abuses of expense and delay are accentuated when one party gains the right
to take depositions before the other. Since the party who has priority is usually
entitled to complete his depositions before the deponent can take his in turn, the
examiner can tie the deponing party down to his story while securing the material
and time to coach his own witnesses effectively. In those cases where depositions
are short, the effect of priority is not very great. Priority, however, becomes an
extremely important tactical advantage when depositions are extended.




opponent's trial preparation. But such reasoning and the reasoning of
the cases ignores the power of the court to limit or condition discovery
and ignores or misconceives the issue formulation function which only
discovery can perform. The rules do not contemplate discovery or no
discovery, but rather mutual discovery under safeguards imposed by
the court where such are indicated. Counsel and the courts must,
however, insure that adequate safeguards are employed so that more
will be gained by all parties and the court than lost by discovery.
The argument based upon making use of an opponent's trial prepar-
ation and thereby interfering with such preparation ignores the power
of the court to provide as a condition of discovery that the party
seeking it retain his experts, obtain their conclusions in written form,
and commit himself to one or more such experts prior to permitting
discovery. Such a condition is not unreasonable where experts are
concerned, for all parties will usually obtain the conclusions of the
experts in a written report form prior to trial and present expert
testimony at trial. A court could permit the deposition of an expert
where the party seeking it has no expert on condition that he would
thereby be precluded from calling any expert at trial,"0 unless the
interests of justice required a modification of such condition. A court
could require the simultaneous exchange of experts' reports, or provide
that depositions be permitted only after the exchange of reports, or
that no expert testimony will be permitted at trial unless the reports
of experts have been exchanged. An order could require that sealed
copies of experts reports be filed with the court prior to permitting
depositions, or that no direct testimony may be introduced at the trial
which is not supported in the expert's report, or require that such
reports be detailed or that a deposition may be taken with only certain
named persons present."1 The court can make any order which justice
Do An example of the flexibility a court has in dealing with discovery problems
appears in Klein v. Yellow Cab Co., 7 F.R.D. 169 (D. Ohio 1944). The plaintiff in a
personal injury action objected to the defendant's motion to compel him to submit to a
physical examination by defendant's surgeon as too painful. The court stated that
before finally ruling on the motion, the plaintiff should submit all reports of examin-
ation by his physician, hospital records, and statements of what his physician would
testify to in respect to the alleged injuries, or in the alternative, if the plaintiff pre-
ferred, he should stipulate that no medical evidence would be introduced by him which
was obtained through cystoscopic examination.
91 Melori Shoe Corp. v. Pierce & Stevens, Inc., 14 F.R.D. 346 (D. Mass. 1953). The
order was entered to protect trade secrets.
However, 15 U.S.C. § 30 (1958) provides that in antitrust actions brought under
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 and § 15, "the proceedings shall be open to the public as freely as are
trials in open court; and no order excluding the public from attendance on any such
proceeding shall be valid or enforceable."
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requires." These suggestions for minimizing or eliminating the possi-
bility of one litigant's taking unreasonable advantage of an opponent's
trial preparation where experts are concerned are not listed as the only
methods, but merely as the obvious ones arising from the court's broad
power.93
It may be argued that if all litigants have experts available to testify,
there is no need for discovery. Such a position, however, ignores or
misconceives the issue formulation function which discovery must per-
form. Seldom, if ever, will the issues concern the underlying facts.9"
Rather, the issues will concern the validity, relevancy and credibility
of tests made, methods used, underlying assumptions, theories, com-
parisons, etc. A party seeking discovery of experts, if he has his own
experts, seldom desires to learn about information readily available.
Rather, he seeks to learn the use to which his opponent's experts have
put the available information. Such can not be learned without dis-
covery. Judge Tamm, in United States v. 48 Jars, 11 a suit for seizure
and condemnation of an article under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, in overruling objections to interrogatories pointed out:
The questions propounded by the libellant are directed to tests, if any,
and experts, if any, that will support the position of the claimants on the
issue of whether the claims made for the article are false or misleading.
It appears from the questions themselves that they are requesting matter
of such a nature that it is within the possession or knowledge of the
claimants only and that the libellant can in no way obtain such infor-
mation through independent investigation or research.9
Similarly, in United States v. Nysco Labs., Inc.,9" also a suit under the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act for misbranding and also before the
court on objections to interrogatories, Judge Bartels said:
Realistically speaking, the resolution of the entire case depends upon
medical and expert testimony and opinion ..... To the extent that infor-
mation concerning medical and scientific facts is within the knowledge
or possession of the defendants, the Court believes such information
should be disclosed.... To clarify and narrow the issues, interrogatories
92 FED. R. CIv. P. 30(b).
93 Many of the limitations and conditions a court may impose upon discovery gen-
erally are discussed at 4 MooRE, FmRAL PRActicE fT 30.06-.15 (2d ed. 1950).
94 See United States v. Nysco Laboratories, Inc., 26 F.R.D. 159, 162 (E.D.N.Y
1960) ; E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.R.D. 416, 421
(D. Del. 1959) and Friedenthal, supra note 73, at 455.
9523 F.R.D. 192 (D.D.C. 1958).
96 Id. at 198. The court relied upon an unpublished opinion of Judge Hincks in the
case of United States v. 132 Cartons (D. Conn. March 27, 1950),
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may be employed to exact admissions from the opposing party. The
Government is entitled to know what the defendant's position and
contentions are on relevant points.98
If obtaining this type of information from an opponent is making
use of his trial preparation, it can not be considered unreasonable if the
parties are in the same position relative to experts, for the right to
discovery is reciprocal, and the advantages to be gained far outweigh
the disadvantages. Learning precisely where and why the experts
differ, not only in their conclusions, but in the support for these con-
clusions, narrows, clarifies and formulates precisely the actual issues
involved. Moreover, such knowledge affords an intelligent basis for
settlement inasmuch as all parties can evaluate each other's position
prior to trial. Without such knowledge, it is submitted that many cases
where experts appear go to trial for no other reason than that an intelli-
gent evaluation for settlement purposes can not be made. Additionally,
discovery is considered a means to expose false claims and defenses.99
Much of the criticism of experts is based on the incompetence, partisan-
ship or dishonesty which all too many display on the witness stand.
The use of such experts, however, is possible because of the difficulty
in exposing their incompetence, partisanship or dishonesty. This
difficulty exists primarily because their opinions and the support for
them are unknown until trial, when it is too late to effectively prepare
cross-examination or rebuttal testimony.0 0 Advance preparation for
cross-examination of experts is more essential than advance warning of
factual testimony. It is submitted that many of the unqualified or
dishonest experts would refuse to mount the witness stand knowing
that counsel is armed with knowledge of expected testimony and,
97 26 F.R.D. 159 (E.D.N.Y 1960).
as Id. at 162.
99 4 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 64, 1 26.02; 6 WiGmoRE, op. cit. supra note 86, §§
1845-63.
100 In United States v. 132 Cartons (D. Conn. March 27, 1950), as quoted in United
States v. 48 Jars, More or Less, 23 F.R.D. 192, 198 (D.D.C. 1958), Judge Hincks said:
Libellant insisted that the discovery was necessary not to elicit their opinions as
experts but rather to ascertain the factual scope and nature of the research done
so that it possibly may be in a better position to cross-examine these witnesses on
trial and prepare a rebuttal to the claimant's defense. Having in mind that the
field in question here is one of scientific controversy wherein without prior dis-
covery cross-examination cannot be expected successfully to perform its historic
function, and effective evidence in rebuttal, though perhaps in existence, cannot be
produced forthwith upon the close of the claimant's defense, I feel that here there
is sufficient showing of necessity, within the rule of Hickman v. Taylor... if
applicable here, to allow the discovery to proceed.
See also Seminar on Practice and Procedure, 28 F.R.D. 37, 101 (1962), and
Friedenthal, supra note 73, at 485.
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because counsel had time to prepare cross-examination and rebuttal
testimony, the means to expose incompetence or dishonesty. Further,
such prior knowledge would tend to require better prepared expert
witnesses and to tone down the excessive zeal prompted by partisanship.
The evils which appear to exist in the application of discovery to
experts by affording the opportunity to make unfair use of an oppon-
ent's trial preparation, on careful examination do not exist if the court
and counsel properly perceive the issue formulation function only
discovery can perform and impose or agree to conditions or limitations
upon discovery so that its advantages can be reciprocally obtained.
Under a practice based on discovery, justice will seldom require the
complete denial of prior disclosure.' The problem, however, is to
employ in each case the means to accomplish discovery in good faith
without annoyance, embarrassment or oppression.
2. Unfairness. The first two reported cases02 dealing with experts
refused to permit discovery on the basis of fairness and policy, not in
the particular case but as a general principle. This view is also implicit
in that advanced by Professor Moore.' The Lewis and Boynton cases
and Moore's view have had a great impact in developing the law re-
stricting discovery in the area of expert information. The consider-
ations of fairness proceed principally from the expense of experts.
Implicit in this view is the assumption that a property interest in favor
of the party or the expert exists in the expert's opinions. Necessity,
however, under this view is an exception to the prohibition upon
discovery.
The rule adopted in the Lewis case was stated by Judge McVicar as
follows:
To permit a party by deposition to examine an expert of the opposite
party before trial, to whom the latter has obligated himself to pay a
considerable sum of money, would be equivalent to taking another's
property without making any compensation therefore. 0 4
101 4 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 64, 1 30.06 states at 2027, "in view of other protective
orders which the court is authorized to make and which would give adequate protection
against a particular abuse, without entirely denying a right to discovery, it will be
seldom that a court will forbid the taking of a deposition altogether."
1
0 2 Boynton v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 36 F. Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1941) ; and
Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21 (W.D. Pa. 1940).
103 4 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 64, 1 26.24.
104 32 F. Supp. 21, 23 (1940). United Air Lines contended that the opinions of its
expert were privileged relying on 70 C. J. 432 § 581, and the English authorities which
include within the protection of the attorney-client privilege communications of experts
either to the client or to the attorney. Without concluding whether the attorney-client
privilege applied, the court in adopting its ruling relied upon the language from
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Judge McLellan in the Boynton case framed his rule in the following
language:
An expert employed by one of the parties ought not to be compelled to
furnish expert testimony to the other just because the latter offers him
compensation. It is his privilege, if not his duty, to refuse compensation
from one of the parties when he has already accepted employment from
the other, and such refusal ought not of itself to result in his being
ordered to testify.05
Professor Moore's view appears to be a synthesis of the views of the
Lewis and Boynton cases and an extension of them.
The court should not ordinarily permit one party to examine an expert
engaged by the adverse party, or to inspect reports prepared by such
expert, in the absence of a showing that the facts or the information
sought are necessary for the moving party's preparation for trial and
cannot be obtained by the moving party's independent investigation or
research. However, since one of the purposes of the Federal Rules as
stated in Rule 1 is to facilitate the inexpensive determination of causes,
the court should have discretion to order discovery upon condition that
the moving party pay a reasonable portion of the fees of the expert. 06
The Lewis and Boynton cases, Moore, and the cases which have
followed them, 07 take the position that to permit discovery of experts
is unfair inasmuch as it is the equivalent of taking another's property' 8
McCarthy v. Palmer, 29 F. Supp. 585 (E.D.N.Y. 1939), to the effect that the rules
were not designed to permit one party to explore the investigations made by the other
litigant. The court concluded after the language above quoted that if any tests made
resulted in a change in the cylinder in issue which would prevent conducting the same
tests with the same results, the expert would be compelled to disclose those tests
actually made and results of such tests.
This decision, frequently relied on, was rendered on rehearing. Judge McVicar
originally was of the opinion that the expert should be compelled to answer the ques-
tions posed and that the motion for an order compelling answers should be granted.
Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 31 F. Supp. 617 (W.D. Pa. 1940).
105 36 F. Supp. 593, 595 (1941). This case was an action by an administrator for the
death of the decedent resulting from a motor vehicle accident. The issue arose upon
a motion for an order directing a doctor to answer questions during a deposition con-
cerning an expert opinion, without the defendant being forced to pay an expert's fee.
At the time of deposition, the doctor had already formed an opinion as to the causal
connection between the accident and the death. After concluding that a court had the
power to compel an expert to divulge an opinion already formed without tender of an
expert's fee, Judge McLellan determined that under the circumstances there presented,
his discretion should not be exercised to compel answers to the questions posed.105 4 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 64, at 1531.1 07 E.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. United States, 26 F.R.D. 213 (D. Del. 1960);
Smith v. Hobart Manufacturing Co., 188 F. Supp. 135 (E.D. Pa. 1960); E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.R.D. 416 (D. Del. 1959) ; United
States v. 88 Cases of Bireley's Orange Beverage, etc., 5 F.R.D. 503 (D.N.J. 1946);
United States v. 720 Bottles Labeled 2 Fl. Oz., 3 F.R.D. 466 (E.D.N.Y. 1944).
0 Walsh v. Reynolds Metals Co., 15 F.R.D. 376 (D.NJ. 1954); United States
v. Certain Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224 (S.D. Cal. 1953); and Lewis v. United Air
Lines Transport Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21 (W.D. Pa. 1940).
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without compensation because of the obligation to pay a considerable
sum for the expert's opinion. Even if compensation is offered, however,
an expert should not be compelled to furnish testimony for this reason
alone, because permitting such discovery would afford the opportunity
to take unwarranted advantage of an opponent's trial preparation.'"
If, however, the expert's information is necessary for trial preparation
and cannot be obtained by independent investigation and research,
discovery should be permitted,"' and if deemed appropriate, the court
could require that part of the expert's fee be paid by the party seeking
discovery."'-
Denying discovery for reasons proceeding from the expense of ex-
perts places undue emphasis upon the expert's expense rather than the
justice, speed and expense of the entire litigation. It makes an un-
warranted discrimination in favor of experts as opposed to other
witnesses, who may suffer greater loss because of the time spent in
having a deposition taken. Were compensation required because of
expertise as a condition of compelling such testimony, it would follow
that compensation should be made to each witness according to the loss
he has suffered. The law, however, recognizes a duty on everyone's
part to testify. The expert's expense, therefore, should no more pre-
clude his discovery testimony than the loss any witness might suffer
because of appearing for deposition." 2 The expense to a party is
minimal if a court requires that a copy of an expert's report be furn-
ished. Even where only one side has experts retained, no unfairness
based on expense would exist to permit a deposition upon payment to
the party of the expense he might incur to the expert at the expert's
usual per diem rate.'" Where all parties have experts or where discov-
ery is postponed until all experts have completed their studies, the
costs of taking depositions are substantially offset, and if discovery is
limited to exchanging reports, the expense is insignificant. Considera-
tions proceeding from the expense of experts, therefore, have no general
109 See cases cited note 107 supra.
110 E.g., Russo v. Merck & Co., 21 F.R.D. 237 (D.R.I. 1957) ; Walsh v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 15 F.R.D. 376 (D.N.J. 1954) ; Colden v. R. J. Schofield Motor Co., 14
F.R.D. 521 (N.D. Ohio 1952); Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 6 F.R.D.
594 (WD. Pa. 1947) ; and Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 32 F. Supp 21
(W.D. Pa. 1940); See also 4 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 64, fT 26.24; But cf. E. I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.R.D. 416 (D. Del. 1959)
and United States v. 48 Jars, 23 F.R.D. 192 (D.D.C. 1958).
"Il See 4 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 64, 26.24; and United States v. 50.34 Acres, 13
F.R.D. 19 (E.D.N.Y. 1952).
112 See Friedenthal, supra note 73, at 479-80.
113 See authority and case cited note 111 supra.
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validity in supporting a rule denying discovery of experts, for the court
has adequate power to protect the pocketbooks of the parties and
experts. 1
The concept that a property right115 in expert information exists
either in the expert or in a party, which merits protection from pre-trial
disclosure, carries more weight than considerations proceeding from
expense alone. Yet, the expense incurred either by a party or by the
expert in the investigation necessary to arrive at the conclusions to
which he will testify, appears to be the basis for holding that a property
right exists in such conclusions."' Thus it becomes difficult to separate
the opinions and conclusions themselves from the expense incurred in
arriving at them."' Each of the three cases 1 which expressly recognize
that such a property right exists in experts' opinions also recognizes
that portions of the conclusions and the underlying facts were subject to
discovery in circumstances of "necessity" ' or expedition. 2 ' The
property right concept has been explored to a considerable extent in
those cases where a party has sought to subpoena an expert at trial and
compel testimony. Although such cases in other jurisdictions are
divided, 21 the federal cases permit such action 22 and recognize the
114 Some courts have questioned the wisdom but not the power to compel a fee
splitting arrangement. E.g., Hickey v. United States, 18 F.R.D. 88 (E.D. Pa. 1952);
United States v. 88 Cases of Bireley's Orange Beverages, 5 F.R.D. 503 (D.N.J. 1946);
and Boynton v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 36 F. Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1941).
115 See cases cited note 108 supra.
116 See cases cited note 107 supra.
117 Although a court has the power to compel the disclosure of existing opinions, it
cannot compel an expert to make an investigation or undertake a study to prepare for
testifying. See Boynton v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 36 F. Supp. 593 (D. Mass.
1941); and 4 Mooax, F=Lma PRAcTicE ff 2624 (2d ed. 1950). Among the reasons for
such distinction is the expense to the expert.
11s See cases cited note 108 supra.
119In Walsh v. Reynolds Metals Co., 15 F.R.D. 376 (D.NJ. 1954), Judge Hart-
shorn at 378-79 said that the conclusions of an expert are not normally discoverable in
view of "the property right of the expert himself, and of his client" in the expert's
conclusions. In that case examination of a gas stove after an explosion involved re-
moving parts for inspection by the expert. The court ordered the expert's notes on the
condition of the stove after the explosion divulged but not the expert's conclusions.
In Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21 (W.D. Pa. 1940),
Judge McVictor said, at 23, that if any tests made by the expert resulted in a change
in the cylinder, in issue which would prevent conducting the same tests with the same
results, the expert would be compelled to disclose those tests actually made as well as
the results of such tests.
120 In United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224 (S.D. Cal. 1953)
Judge Mathes, after ordering the production of appraisal reports for in camera inspec-
tion, ordered the sales data contained therein divulged on the ground of expedition.
In that case, the court recognized that discovery might limit the realizable value
of presently undisclosed opinions. It is submitted, however, that this objection could
be cured by providing for disclosure only to certain named persons as is done where
the court desires to protect trade secrets.
1L21 See Annot., 77 A.L.R2d 1182 (1961).
122 4 MooPE, op. cit. supra note 117, 1 2624.
1964]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
power of a court to compel answers to hypothetical questions. However,
an expert can not be compelled to make investigations or otherwise
prepare himself to answer questions for which his present knowledge is
insufficient." 3 The rules are a product of the view that the public
interest in justice is paramount to considerations of fairness to
attorneys, witnesses or parties. Evidence, therefore, can not wilfully
be withheld, nor does a property right exist in evidence, whether expert
or not, which supersedes the interest of the courts to use it in ascer-
taining truth" 4 except within the confines of privilege or when such
evidence is shielded by an exclusionary rule designed to protect a con-
stitutional right. Discovery of expert information takes away no
property without compensation, for the right to discovery is reciprocal
and the court has the power to order compensation.'25 Thus, the de-
termination of whether a property right exists is not conclusive on the
question whether discovery should be granted or prohibited. Rather,
the problem presented by this objection concerns the weight it should
be accorded and the methods which should be employed to ameliorate
the objection.
Permitting discovery of expert information as an exception to the
unfairness rule where the information sought is necessary to a party's
trial preparation or where such information can not be obtained by
independent investigation or research can readily be justified. A party
to litigation should have the means to establish his case and therefore
the opportunity to obtain whatever is necessary to this end. Necessity
was the basis of the limited discovery permitted under earlier practice.'
Such a restriction upon discovery, however, prevents any opportunity
to learn what evidence is available and what issues exist which must be
met at the trial. Under our notice pleading practice, without discovery,
the parties are in an awkward position where no adequate mechanism
is available to learn and frame the issues.' In addition, without the
opportunity to learn prior to trial what each party will rely on for
123 Ibid.
124 See Sachs v. Aluminum Co. of America, 167 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948).
125 See authorities cited note 111 supra.
1264 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 117, 33.03.
127 Id. ff 26.02, at 1032: "In most cases under the Federal Rules the function of the
pleadings extends hardly beyond notification to the opposing parties of the general
nature of a party's claim or defense." Also on the previous page Moore states, "The
promulgation of this group of Rules [the discovery rules] satisfied the long-felt need
for legal machinery in the federal courts to supplement the pleadings, for the purpose
of disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties ... ." See Taejon Bristle
Mfg. Co. v. Omnex Corp., 13 F.R.D. 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) ; Radio Corp. of America v.
Solat, 31 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) ; and Pearson v. Hershey Creamery Co., 30 F.
Supp. 82 (M.D. Pa. 1939).
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expert information, the parties are prevented from properly evaluating
a cause for settlement. Moreover, without discovery, little opportunity
exists to expose a claim or defense based upon false, incompetent or
exaggerated expert testimony.'
What circumstances constitute necessity so as to afford the oppor-
tunity to discover expert information is not clear from the cases. Under
Professor Moore's view,'29 necessity must relate to the moving party's
preparation for trial. Under his view, the information sought is discov-
erable only if it can not be obtained by independent investigation or
research. The casesP'i which have found that such necessity existed
concerned situations where because of destruction or change in an
object, the existing expert information is the only information which
could ever be available.' The moving party could not hire an expert
who would have the means available to arrive at an opinion on the
matters involved in the litigation.82 In some of the cases,' the expert
128 See authorities cited note Ill supra.
128 4 Moore, op. cit. supra note 117, 2624.
20 E.g., Russo v. Merck & Co., 21 F.R.D. 237 (D.R.I. 1957) ; Walsh v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 15 F.R.D. 376 (D.N.J. 1954); Colden v. R.J. Schofield Motors Co., 14
F.R.D. 521 (N.D. Ohio, 1952) ; Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 6 F.R.D.
594 (W.D. Pa. 1947).131 See cases cited note 130 supra.
132 Walsh v. Reynolds Metals Co., 15 F.R.D. 376 (D.N.J. 1954), discussed at note
119 supra; and Colden v. R.J. Schofield Motors Co., 14 F.R.D. 52 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
In the latter case Chief Judge Jones held that a sufficient showing of necessity was
made, not under the unfairness rule but under the work product doctrine to warrant
requiring production of an expert's report where due to disassembly of the automobile
involved during the process of inspection and examination by the expert, the party
seeking the report was not in a position to obtain the information sought from any
other source. Cf. Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21 (W.D.
Pa. 1940).
133 Russo v. Merck & Co. 21 F.R.D. 237 (D.R.I. 1957) ; Connecticut Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Shields, 17 F.R.D. 277 (S.D.N.Y 1955) and Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines
Steel Co., 6 F.R.D. 594 (W.D. Pa. 1947). See also Beirne v. Fitch Sanitarium, 20
F.R.D. 93 (S.D.N.Y 1957) and Kendall v. United Air Lines, 9 F.R.D. 702 (S.D.N.Y
1949).
In the Moran case, supra, the plaintiff's decedent was killed in an explosion of a
liquified gas tank constructed by the defendant. The plaintiff sought to compel answers
from a graduate civil engineer employed by the defendant. The engineer had final
approval of the cylindrical tank and the chemical constituency of the steel used in
constructing the tank. Judge Gourley stated that the answers will amount to a state-
ment of facts as to why certain things were done or not done by the defendant and that
unless such information was made available to the plaintiff, a full and complete picture
would not be presented from which a determination could be made whether there was
negligence in constructing the tank. The rule adopted was set out at 596 as follows:
Where an individual is an expert in a given field, and, therefore, qualified to
submit an opinion, this will not deprive a party litigant from questioning said
person, either by way of deposition or during trial, and asking why certain things
were done or not done by the witness where said person is-
(a) Employed regularly by the adverse party, and
(b) Is the managing agent of a department, and
(c) The person who decided all matters for the adverse party in the creation
of the object from which the cause of action arises.
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was an employee of a party and the only one having knowledge about
the matter in issue. Under this view, in cases where such information is
readily available, necessity can not be shown.' This view, however,
ignores narrowing and clarifying the issues as an object of discovery.
There are, however, a few cases 3 ' which have found necessity to
exist on the ground that the expert information, as opposed to readily
available underlying facts, is exclusively within the knowledge or pos-
session of the witness or party. Under this view, unless the procedures
of experts can be inquired into and records of actual tests produced for
examination before trial, the parties will not know before trial what
evidence is available for introduction at trial. 3 This reasoning im-
plicitly recognizes the issue formulation function which discovery must
perform. It is submitted, however, that this reasoning supports a rule
authorizing discovery of expert information rather than an exception to
a rule precluding such discovery.' In almost every case where expert
testimony is involved, the methods, tests, procedures, assumptions and
comparisons of the experts which support the experts' opinions and con-
clusions, will be the areas where the issues exist.'38 Such evidence and
issues will be unknown prior to trial without discovery. This kind of
information can not be obtained by independent investigation or
research.
In evaluating the weight to be accorded to the unfairness objection,
it is essential to distinguish among the reasons motivating the party
seeking disclosure of expert information. The unfairness of permitting
discovery of expert information is evident when the moving party,
although intending to call experts at trial, either has not hired experts,
or having hired them has not obtained the results of their studies at the
time disclosure of his adversary's expert information is sought. When a
case is in such posture, it is difficult to conceive of discovery performing
an issue formulation function, and the possibility of unreasonable inter-
134 E.g., United States v. 6.82 Acres, 18 F.R.D. 195 (D.N.M. 1955) ; United States
v. Certain Acres, 18 F.R.D. 98 (M.D. Ga. 1955) ; United States v. 7534.04 Acres, 18
F.R.D. 146 (N.D. Ga. 1954), and Dipson Theatres v. Buffalo Theatres, 8 F.R.D. 313
(W.D.N.Y. 1948).
135 E.g., United States v. Nysco Labs Inc., 26 F.R.D. 159 (E.D.N.Y 1960); E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.R.D. 416 (D. Del. 1959);
United States v. 48 Jars, 23 F.R.D. 192 (D.D.C. 1958) and Virginia Metal Prod. Corp.
v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 10 F.R.D. 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
136 E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., supra note 135.
137 See Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information,
14 STAN. L. REv. 455, 486 (1962).
138 See Winner, Procedural Methods to Attain Discovery, 28 F.R.D. 97, 101-03
(1962) and McGlothlin, Some Practical Problems in Proof of Economic, Scientific and
Technical Facts, 23 F.R.D. 467, 478 (1959).
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ference with trial preparation exists. In such circumstances, consider-
ations of expense and property rights are entitled to weight, and con-
siderations of fairness are inherent in discovery as well as other pro-
cedural aspects of litigation. The solution to the problem posed, how-
ever, is not simply refusing to permit prior disclosure of expert informa-
tion. The solution is to postpone discovery until the experts of all
parties have completed their studies. At that time, prior disclosure of
expert information should be encouraged on such conditions and with
such limitations that the advantages of such disclosure are reciprocally
obtainable.
3. Extension of the "Work Product Doctrine." Although declining
to extend the attorney-client privilege"9 to encompass all matters ob-
tained by an attorney in preparation for trial, the Supreme Court in
Hickman v. Taylor 4 refused to permit discovery of such matters as of
right. In holding that a showing of necessity or justification must be
made to obtain discovery of such matters, the court grounded its de-
cision upon the public policy underlying the orderly prosecution and
defense of legal claims in the following language:
Proper preparation of a client's case demands that he assemble infor-
mation, sift what he considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant
facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without undue and
needless interference. That is the historical and necessary way in which
lawyers act within the framework of our system of jurisprudence to
promote justice and to protect their clients' interests. This work is re-
flected, of course, in interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence,
briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible
and intangible ways aptly though roughly termed by the Circuit Court
of Appeals in this case, as the "work product of the lawyer." Were such
materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what is
now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An attorney's
thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his own. Inefficiency, un-
fairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the giving of
legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the
legal profession would be demoralizng. And the interests of the clients
and the cause of justice would be poorly served.14'
The divergence of opinions applying the so-called work product rule
is proof that precise application of the doctrine is not easily accom-
139 An excellent analysis of this privilege is contained in United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 349 (D. Mass. 1950).




plished.'42 Beyond refusing to permit discovery as of right in the area
of an attorney's trial preparation, the decision does little to guide the
exercise of discretion. As far as extending the doctrine to expert
witnesses, however, the underlying policy of the decision offers little
support. The purported justification for extending this policy to
experts is that retaining, advising and conferring with the expert makes
him the attorney's agent or in effect co-counsel to whom the protection
should extend.143 Further support for this position is found in Alltmont
v. United States,44 where statements obtained by agents of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation were at stake. The third circuit took the
position that statements obtained by the client, investigator or attorneys
were within the protection of the work product doctrine.
Although most of the cases 45 which have considered the application
142 4 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 117, 1 2624 n.1 states that with one exception
(Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 6 F.R.D. 594 (W.D. Pa. 1947), which
cited no cases) all cases decided since Hickman concerning discovery and experts
cited Hickman even though they were in conflict.
Wright, Recent Trends in the Practical Use of Discovery, 16 NACCA L.J. 409,
415 (1955), discusses some of the problems created by the opinion.
An extreme example of divergent opinions arose in Cold Metal Process Co. v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 425 (N.D. Ohio 1947), a patent infringement suit
brought in the Northern Division of the Eastern District of Tennessee. Aluminum
Company of America sought to depose two expert metallurgists engaged by counsel.
Doctor George Sachs refused to answer certain questions and a motion was brought to
compel answers in the N.D. Ohio. Judge Wilkin stated at 427 that, "The case turns
on an application of the principles announced in Hickman v. Taylor," and ordered Dr.
Sachs to answer the question posed. Judge Sweeney under similar circumstances in the
District of Massachusetts, Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7
F.R.D. 684 (D. Mass 1947), refused to compel Dr. Martin J. Buerger to answer ques-
tions posed on his deposition. At the time Judge Sweeney ruled, the case involving Dr.
Sachs was pending before the 6th Circuit. In support of his ruling, Judge Sweeney
said at 687:
While the movant relies upon Hickman v. Taylor, supra, I can find nothing in
that decision which will sustain its claim to examine Dr. Buerger as a matter of
right. On the contrary, I think that the case of Hickman v. Taylor, supra, is
ample authority for the denial of the motion."
On appeal from a contempt citation, the 6th Circuit in Sachs v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 167 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948) (per curiam), affirmed Judge Wilkin, holding
that the attorney-client privilege did not apply nor did the case fall within the protection
of the work product doctrine.
143 This idea appears to have originated with Lalance & Grosjean Mfg. Co. v.
Haberman Mfg. Co., 87 Fed. 563 (2d Cir. 1898), where the court said, at 565, con-
cerning an expert:
It does, however, appear that he has been retained by plaintiffs as an expert to
assist them in the presentation of their case. As such the witness would seem to
come within the privilege... as similar to that of counsel. More careful reflection
has still further confirmed the impression that such privilege should be forfeited
if the "scientific counsel" assume the role of a witness.
144 177 F.2d 971 (3rd Cir. 1949).
145 E.g., Sachs v. Aluminum Co. of America, 167 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948) ; E. I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.R.D. 416 (D. Del. 1959);
Leding v. U.S. Rubber Co., 23 F.R.D. 220 (D. Mont. 1959) ; United States v. 50.34
Acres, 13 F.R.D. 19 (E.D.N.Y. 1952) ; and United States v. 300 Cans of Black Rasp-
berries, 7 F.R.D. 36 (N.D. Ohio 1947).
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of the work product doctrine to experts have rejected such an extension,
it has been applied to preclude discovery in a number of cases."8 Ex-
tension of this doctrine to experts without qualification appears to be
unsound. Unlike an attorney's, client's or investigator's recollection of
potential witnesses' conversations or even the statements obtained from
potential witnesses, expert information in the form of opinions and
conclusions and the support therefor constitute evidence. In Hickman
and Alltmont, it appears that the potential witnesses involved were
available for deposition. Accordingly, no good cause or necessity could
be established why statements by such potential witnesses or the
attorney's recollection of conversations with such witnesses should be
produced. The only justification for permitting such discovery ap-
peared to be the potential impeachment value of the material sought.
If the deposition of an expert could be taken, then a holding that no
good cause is established when an expert's report is sought could be
justified, not on the basis of the work product rule, but because the
report could have but potential impeachment value. On the other hand,
if the expert's deposition can not be taken for whatever reason, and his
report can not be produced under the work product doctrine, no means
exists to learn before trial what the evidence will be, unlike the situation
in Hickman and Alltmont, nor does any means exist to narrow and
clarify the issues which will be examined at trial arising out of the
expert's information. It is submitted that ordinarily the most conven-
ient means to learn what evidence is available and to narrow and
clarify the issues is to compel the production of experts' reports, pre-
ferably by requiring a simultaneous exchange.
The rationale of the work product doctrine may have validity where
the expert's function is to assist counsel before and during trial, but
where he is not expected to testify. This latter situation, however, is
comparatively rare. Yet, it suggests an area where discovery may be
denied on the basis justifying the work product doctrine. The expert,
although usually a witness during the trial, often performs functions
before trial in assisting counsel to prepare direct and cross-examin-
ation. 47 If such matters were subject to discovery, the rationale of the
work product doctrine would justify denial of discovery.
148 E.g., Carpenter-Trant Drilling Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Corp., 23 F.R.D. 257
(D. Neb. 1959) ; Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D. Ohio
1953); Colden v. R. J. Schofield Motors Co., 14 F.R.D. 521 (N.D. Ohio 1952);
Schuyler v. United Air Lines, 10 F.R.D. 111 (M.D. Pa. 1950) ; Cold Metal Process Co.
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 684 (D. Mass. 1947).
147 See note 143 supra.
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The problem presented by a possible unwarranted interference with
trial preparation is not solved in the area of expert information by a
facile statement that the work product doctrine does or does not
apply. Insofar as we are concerned with the conclusions to which he
expects to testify and the support for them, including methods, tests,
techniques and evaluations, the expert should stand in no different
position than any other witness. In a given case, the answer to the
problem may lie in confining discovery to the exchange of experts'
reports; in another case, to limiting discovery to matters to which the
expert expects to testify, or providing that certain specified matters
may not be discovered. In any event, the doctrine should be given no
general application precluding expert information from discovery.
THE OPINION RULE
A commonly invoked restriction upon discovery is that "it is the
ascertainment of facts that is the object of discovery proceedings as
contrasted with opinions, conclusions or contentions.""" To a large
extent, there is a tendency to think of discovery as a medium solely
for getting at facts. The contentions of the parties, the opinions of
experts, and knowledge of the issues are not accorded much discovery
significance." 9 It should be clear, however, that according to the
concept of notice pleading and discovery, there was no intention by
the drafters of the rules that parties should go to trial with issues
only vaguely defined. 5 Unless discovery extends to contentions,
148 Cinema Amusements v. Loew's, Inc., 7 F.R.D. 318, 320 (D. Del. 1947).
"9 Willis, The Practical Operations of Federal Discovery, 12 F.R.D. 131, 161
(1952).
150 An extreme example of going to trial without issues or issues only vaguely de-
fined is the usual eminent domain proceeding. Under rule 71 A (e), a notice of appear-
ance is the only pleading called for from a property owner.
It has been stated that the only issue in a condemnation case is just compensation,
McCandless v. United States, 298 U.S. 342, 348 (1936) and for this reason discovery is
unnecessary. Dolan, Federal Condemnation Practice-General Aspects, 27 APPRAISAL
J. 15, 18 (1959). This is only partly true. Condemnation trials present issues con-
cerning the determination of what is the whole parcel; the highest and best use of the
property; applicable zoning and probability of change in zoning; what sales are com-
parable and how each is compared to a property taken or partly taken; the cost of
reproduction and the method used in determining such cost together with depreciation
estimates and the methods used as well as supporting data; the gross and net income,
expenses, a property's reasonable rental value, and the basis for selection of a capitaliza-
tion rate; whether severance damage exists and if so its source, etc. Under present
practice generally these issues are not known until trial when it is frequently too late to
effectively cross-examine an expert or prepare rebuttal testimony. More importantly,
unless the position of each party is known as well as the support for it, no intelligent
evaluation can be made for settlement purposes.
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opinions and issues, there is no effective way to determine them prior
to trial.' The emphasis on mutual knowledge before trial to afford
better preparation and therefore shorter trial time on the real issues,
requires clearly defined issues, not only of fact, but of contentions as
well, and particularly of expert evidence. 52 In cases in which experts
are called to testify, the decisions frequently turn on such evidence. 55
In such cases, the issues will concern the validity of comparisons,
methods, techniques, theories and conclusions to which the expert will
testify; they will not be concerned, except incidentally, with the
underlying facts. 5  Many of the articles,' texts 58 and cases15 urging
discovery of opinions and contentions as a means of clarifying issues
concern nonevidentiary matters. Certainly, if such matters are or
should be the subject of discovery on that basis, the opinions and con-
tentions of experts admissible in evidence should be discoverable
inasmuch as prior knowledge of them would have greater impact in
clarifying and narrowing the issues.
No distinction between fact and opinion can be found in the rules.
It is a relic from the limited discovery permitted under earlier practice.
Equity Rule 58 was limited to "discovery by the opposite party or
parties of facts and documents material to the support or defense of
the cause." " The original Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in essence simply authorized interrogatories and provided
for the mechanics of service.' The only indication of the scope inter-
rogatories might take was contained in the Advisory Committee Note
which simply stated, "This rule restates the substance of Equity Rule
58 (Discovery-Interrogatories-Inspection and Production of Docu-
ments-Admission of Execution or Genuineness) with modification to
conform to these rules."' Whether Rule 33 as originally adopted was
as broad as Rule 26 in authorizing discovery was therefore not only
subject to debate, but the Committee Note perhaps justified a con-
151 Willis, supra note 149, at 161. See also 4 MooRE, op. cit. s'upra note 117, 1 33.17.
152 See authorities cited note 151 supra.
53 See e.g., United States v. Nysco Laboratories, Inc., 26 F.R.D. 159, 162 (E.D.N.Y
1960) ; E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.R.D. 416, 421
(D. Del. 1959); and Friedenthal, supra note 137, at 455.
15 See Winner, supra note 138, 101-03; McGlothlin, supra note 138, at 478.
155 E.g., Willis, supra note 149, at 161.
156 E.g., 4 MooRE, op cit. supra note 117, 1 33.17.
.57 E.g., Broadway and 96th St Realty Co. v. Loew's Inc., 21 F.R.D. 347 (S.D.N.Y
1958).
158 4 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 117, 33.02, at 2257 n.1.
'59 Id. 11 33.03 for a discussion of discovery under Equity Rule 58.
160 Id. 1 33.01, at 2255.
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struction as narrow as earlier practice gave Equity Rule 58. After the
rules went into effect, a number of cases arose excluding opinions,
conclusions and contentions from the scope of interrogatories, the most
significant of which was the opinion of Judge Chestnut in Coca Cola
v. Dixi-Cola Labs., Inc.'61 Very few of the decisions give any reasoned
explanation for their holdings."8 2 Thus, a restriction of Equity Rule 58
was carried over to encrust Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Although the 1946 amendment to Rule 33 made clear that
interrogatories "may relate to any matters which can be inquired into
under Rule 26 (b)," the restriction upon inquiry into matters of
opinion not only remained, 8' but has been extended to limit discovery
under Rule 26 and Rule 34. 1" The distinction85 between fact and
opinion is particularly without merit when we are concerned with
experts. The facts of litigation where experts testify are opinions,"6'
and the issues relate to method, technique and judgment. 7 They
can not be learned before trial except by discovery. The underlying
rationale of most of the decisions excluding opinions, and therefore
expert opinions, from discovery appears to have no sounder foundation
than the position that the purpose of discovery is limited to the ascer-
tainment of facts. It is clear, however, that this view finds no
181 30 F. Supp. 275 (D. Md. 1939). Many of the cases so holding are cited in 4
MOORE, op. cit. supra note 117, ff 33.17 n.1.162 Id. 33.17.
18 E.g., Snyder v. Atchison, T.S.F.R.R. 11 FEn. RULES SERv. 33.351, Case 1 (W D.
Mo. 1948), which appears to be the ultimate in technicality. An interrogatory asked
whether a door in the defendant's railroad coach fell upon the plaintiff. The court in
sustaining an objection to the interrogatory said that since the defendant was a cor-
poration, "any answer that it might make would be but the expression of an opinion."
1.4 E.g., United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 25 F.R.D. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
In denying a motion under rule 34 the court at page 193 said: "One of the lines of
limitation, which federal courts have drawn, relates to the discovery of opinionative
material." See also, United States v. 19.897 Acres, 27 F.R.D. 420 (E.D.N.Y. 1961);
Berkley v. Clark Equipment Co., 26 F.R.D. 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); and United States
v. Certain Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
165 What is fact and what is opinion is a matter of degree. "Very little, if any, of the
'factual' information possessed by a human being is not based upon inference, deduction
or conclusion." Dusek v. United Air Lines, 9 F.R.D. 326, 327 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
See also Katasafaros v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Co., 15 FED. RULES SERv. 33.342,
Case 3 (N.D. Ohio 1951); 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1917-29 (3rd ed. 1940); and Frie-
denthal, supra note 137, at 481.
18 6 In E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.R.D. 416
(D. Del. 1959), a patent infringement suit, Judge Kirkpatrick at 421 stated, "looked
at from a practical rather than a legalistic point of view, the facts of a case like this,
are the opinions of experts, and the groundwork for those opinions comes within the
ambit of a proper search for facts beyond the knowledge of the moving party."
167 27Te "Prettyman Report," Procedure in Anti-Trust and Other Protracted Cases,
13 F.R.D. 62 (1953), states at 79: "When experts differ in their conclusions, it is
usually because they differ in their qualifications, the basic material used, or the
processes by which they fashion their conclusions from the material used." See also
McGlothin, supra note 138, at 467.
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justification in the language of the rules and ignores narrowing and
clarifying issues as a main objective of discovery.16 s
In 1944, one case 69 denied inquiry into opinions on the ground that
interrogatories were limited to admissible evidence. Whether or not
such reasoning had merit when that decision was rendered, the 1946
amendments to Rule 33 and Rule 26 make it clear that the scope of
interrogatories under Rule 33 is as broad as discovery under Rule 26,
and emphasized that inadmissibility at trial was not ground for ob-
jection "if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence."1 ' In any event, such reason-
ing would not exclude expert opinion from discovery. Granting the
validity of the rule excluding opinions from trial testimony, it has no
application to experts. 17 '
A reason related to admissibility in evidence was given in a con-
demnation case 72 as the basis for excluding expert information from
discovery. The court said that the opinions of an appraiser were
immaterial and incompetent as evidence until the appraiser was called
as a witness during the trial and qualified as an expert. Such reasoning
is specious for it would preclude discovery of anyone. The questions
of materiality of evidence and competence of witnesses may always be
raised at trial with any witness or with portions of testimony. Such a
limitation based on testimonial qualification ignores the requirement
that "evidence objected to shall be taken subject to the objections.' ' 78
Moreover, it ignores the practical fact that a party to a condemnation
'168 See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 48 (1957) ; Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
495 (1947); 4 MooRn, FEDEARAlPacnica ff 33.17 (2d ed. 1950) ; Willis, supra note
149, at 161; and Discovery as to Opinions, Conclusions and Contentions, 16 Fmn. RuLEs
SEnv. 874 (1952).
169 Heawood v. Louisiana & Ark. R. R., 7 Frn. RuLxS S arv. 33.31, Case 2 (W.D.
Mo. 1944).
170 Rule 26(b).
1717 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 165, §§ 1917-29.
172 United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224 (S.D. Cal. 1953). judge
Mathes, although recognizing that a pretrial exchange of the opinions of appraisers in
a condemnation case undoubtedly would tend to shorten cross-examination and other-
wise expedite adjudication and would be in furtherance of the declared policy of the
rules to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of a lawsuit declined to
permit discovery of appraisers' opinions. In addition to grounding his decision on the
lack of established testimonial qualification prior to trial the court stated that ap-
praisal opinions are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence and have evidentiary value as potential impeachment material but could
rarely aid trial preparation in any other way. The fallacy of the court's additional
observations are obvious. The appraisal opinions may very well be admissible evidence
and certainly are relevant to the subject matter involved in a condemnation case.
Moreover, they have value beyond potential impeachment material. Knowledge of the
precise areas of difference between the appraisers on both sides would clearly tend to
narrow and clarify the issues in condemnation litigation. See also note 181 infra.
'7 Rule 30 (c).
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case retaining an appraiser usually does so with the expectation that
he will qualify as an expert and testify in the event of trial. It may
well be that many of the cases holding opinions outside the scope of
discovery can be justified-not on the basis of an a priori rule, but
on the ground that such inquiry is unduly annoying, oppressive, bur-
densome or embarrassing in the circumstances presented. Thus, if a
witness is not qualfied, either because he lacks the training, education
or experience of an expert or because he lacks the means to form an
opinion, to require such a person to answer may unduly annoy, em-
barrass or oppress the witness or a party.174 Even if an answer is
given, however, the harm may be remedied at trial because the rules
governing admissibility at trial are narrower than those applicable
to discovery. But, beyond the right to exclude such evidence at trial,
it would be anomalous to preclude discovery on the basis of lack of
established testimonial qualification and then admit expert opinion
testimony from the same witness at trial.
An objection to inquiry into matters of opinion carrying some weight
was expressed in Ryan v. Lehigh Valley R.R."' The court pointed out
that to require an answer to an interrogatory calling for matters of
opinion and contention would commit a party to a position too early.
Further, the court added that a case ought to be decided on all the
evidence and a party should not be foreclosed by answers to inter-
rogatories from making any contention that the evidence might justify.
The answers to these objections do not lie in denying discovery but
rather postponing it until such time as the party is committed to a
position and attributing to the answers to such interrogatories no
more binding effect than the pleadings possess. At some time prior
to trial, the party objecting to discovery on these grounds will have
committed himself to call certain experts and to assert certain opinions
and contentions. At that time, or at least at some point prior to trial,
all parties will be in a position where discovery would not commit a
party to experts, opinions and contentions too early. Moreover,
17 4 In Macrina v. Smith, 18 F.R.D. 254 (E.D. Pa. 1955), a question in the field of
neuroses was found unduly embarrassing when posed to an osteopath anaesthetist who
had no training or practical experience in the field of neuroses.
In Beirne v. Fitch Sanitarium, 20 F.R.D. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), the issue arose on
motion to limit examination under Rule 30(d). In ruling that a series of hypothetical
questions based on an assumed state of facts was improper, Judge Weinfield said that
if the hypothetical aspects of the questions were omitted the questions could be put to
the witness. Cf. Coxe v. Putney, 26 F.R.D. 562 (E.D. Pa. 1961) where the court
permitted hypothetical questions in a malpractice action where there was previous
deposition testimony supporting the facts assumed in the hypothetical question.
1755 F.R.D. 399 (S.D.N.Y 1946).
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answers to interrogatories do not preclude a party from making any
contention which the evidence will justify. The answer to this part
of the argument has been adequately expressed in the following
language:
This argument, however, assumes too much. In liberalizing the rules
on pleading the Advisory Committee meant to abolish the strait jacket
effect which pleadings formerly had; ... (see Rule 15 (b) amendments
to pleadings, and Rule 54 (c) judgment in accordance with the evi-
dence). Certainly interrogatories are not to be used as a new style
strait jacket. But to say that interrogatories may be used as adjuncts
to the pleadings is not to say that they are to be given more of a binding
effect than the pleadings. "Even the pretrial order, which controls the
subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent
manifest injustice," (Rule 16) is not given rigid effect in limiting the
issues at the trial. Conceding that the party should have some leeway
at the trial to adjust his legal arguments to the evidence that is adduced,
it is not asking too much that he indicate prior to trial just what his
basic legal contentions are.176
Similarly, granting that a party should have some leeway at trial to
adjust his position based on the evidence adduced, it is not asking too
much that he indicate prior to trial the expert evidence upon which
he intends to rely 7
In United States v. 19.897 Acres of Land,"'8 Judge Lavatt refused
to compel answers to interrogatories calling for the disclosure of
appraisal opinions on the ground that at the time propounded, the
United States did not know which appraisers would be called as
witnesses at trial and therefore the court did not want to commit the
United States to state what particular factor or factors would be
relied upon. The court, however, required the parties to exchange
lists of comparable sales containing the names of seller and purchaser,
location of the property, the date of sale and the date, book and page
of deed recordation. Such lists were to be exchanged "simultaneously
.76 Discovery, supra note 168, at 877.
177 An aspect of this problem appeared in United States v. Watchmakers of Switzer-
land Information Center, Inc., 2 FED. RULES SRnv. 2d 33.353, Case 3 (S.D.N.Y 1959).
Although agreeing that interrogatories should be used to clarify the issues, the court
refused to require answers calling for opinions and contentions on the ground that the
issues should not be narrowed by forcing a party to answer under oath matters not
within its knowledge. If, however, the matter subject to inquiry is material to the
litigation, someone will establish the matter during trial or will have knowledge of it.
If not, possibly the interrogatory is annoying, oppressive or burdensome. Moreover,
Rule 33 only requires a party to "furnish such information as is available to the party."17s 27 F.R.D. 420 (EMD.N.Y. 1961).
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on or before 30 days before the date fixed for trial."' 79 As earlier
pointed out, the parties will have committed themselves prior to trial
to call certain experts, who in turn will be committed to certain factors
in support of their opinions. Certainly, if the parties are in a position
to exchange comparable sales data thirty days prior to trial, they would
be in a position to answer the interrogatories to which objection was
made.' This position precluding discovery of the opinions of expert
appraisal witnesses but permitting disclosure of "factual data" has
been taken in two other condemnation cases.'' It is submitted that
these cases misconceive the issue formulation function of discovery.
Although knowledge of the sales each side will rely upon may be
helpful in affording the opportunity prior to trial to examine such
sales,"'82 it does not go far enough. Such sales data will probably have
been examined by each party prior to trial in any event, but the issues
concerning them will seldom relate to sale dates, parties to such sales,
areas or prices, but rather to the comparisons made, the adjustments
in comparing the sales to the property in issue and the support for
such adjustments. These issues can not be learned before trial except
by discovery, and refusing to permit inquiry into opinions of experts
ignores this important function which discovery alone must perform.
19 Id. at 423. At page 422 the court said "it would tend to shorten the trial if
both sides knew in advance of the trial, what sales of other properties each party may
contend on the trial can possibly be relevant to the issue of value of the damaged par-
cel. Such advance notice would afford each party the opportunity to examine all such
parcels and inquire into the terms and conditions of each sale before the trial for the
purpose either of supporting or attacking the weight to be given to the same by the
trier of the fact...."
380 The interrogatories sought the names of the governnent's appraisers, the date of
each appraisal, copies of the appraisal reports, lists of sales relied on, value as ap-
praised, and statements of the appraisers' qualifications.
18" United States v. 284,392 Square Feet, 203 F. Supp. 75 (E.D.N.Y. 1962) and
United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224 (S.D. Cal. 1953). In the
latter case, also discussed in the text accompanying footnote 172 and in that footnote,
the court pointed out that an appraisal report might contain information regarding
comparable sales which were not a matter of public record which information might
itself afford the basis for or tend to corroborate the testimony of the experts of the
party seeking discovery as well as affording a basis for cross-examination. Accord-
ingly, after an in camera inspection of the report, such "factual data" was turned over
to the party seeking discovery. See also Berkley v. Clark Equipment Co., 26 F.R.D.
1953 (E.D.N.Y. 1960) where discovery of the conclusions of an accountant was denied.
182 The practice of requiring an exchange of comparable sales data appears to have
originated with Judge Carter of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of California. His practice in condemnation cases is part of his pre-trial
procedure and is discussed in his article, Pre-Trial in Cotdemnation Cases, A New
Approach, 40 AM. JUD. Soc'Y 78 (1956). The Land Condemnation Pre-trial Order
(outline and check list) adopted as part of the Amendments and Additions to the local
Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington,
effective October 1, 1962, in paragraph 15 provides for the exchange of comparable
sales data. See also N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 15-16.0, N.Y. LAWS 1937, ch. 929, at
159-60; S.D. CAL. R. 9; and CALIFORNIA LAW REVIsION COMM'N. STUDY No. 4,
DIscovERY IN EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS (1963).
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Whether discovery should be denied, limited, conditioned or per-
mitted is not subject to any formula of broad scope so as to furnish an
infallible touchstone for every specific case, nor can such a formula as
the opinion rule even furnish a method of attack. 88 As with other
discovery problems, the courts and attorneys should not be concerned
with distinctions between facts, opinions, theories and contentions,
but rather whether an answer to the inquiry would serve any useful
purpose either in leading to admissible evidence or in narrowing and
clarifying the issues. Beyond this, consideration should be given to
whether answering the inquiry would unduly burden or prejudice the
interrogated party,', and to determining how prior disclosure can be
effected to eliminate undue burden or prejudice.
UNLIMITED DISCOVERY OF EXPERTS
The decisions which have permitted discovery in the area of expert
opinions have been concerned principally with the problem whether
any recognized privilege 85 existed protecting an expert's opinion from
discovery8 6 and whether an answer to the inquiry could be compelled
at trial.187 The federal courts have found little difficulty in concluding
that no recognized privilege protects such opinions. It seems clear
that the attorney-client privilege extends only to communications be-
tween a client and an attorney and does not extend to the knowledge
18 3 In speaking of the opinion rule, the court in Caldwell-Clements, Inc., v. McGraw-
Hill Publishing Co., 12 F.R.D. 531, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) said "[I]t has been recognized
that many such rules have gone too far and tend to defeat the purpose of the deposi-
tion-discovery rules."
18sUnited States v. Renault, Inc., 3 FED. RU.Es SEav. 2d 33.53, Case 3 (S.D.N.Y
1960) ; Territory of Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 135 F. Supp. 164 (D. Alaska 1955) ; Inter-
national Nickel Co., Inc., v. Ford Motor Co., 15 F.R.D. 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) ; Interbor-
ough News Co. v. Curtis Pub. Co., 14 F.R.D. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Taylor v. Sound
S. S. Lines, 100 F. Supp. 388 (D. Conn. 1951); 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAccICE f 33.17
(2d ed. 1950).
185 The courts are not agreed whether federal law or state law controls the question
of privilege in various types of cases. Cf. 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FERA. PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE, § 651, at 320; 4 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 168 J 26.23, 34.15; and
Leszynski v. Russ, 29 F.R.D. 10 (D. Md. 1961) and note 65 supra.
188 E.g., Sachs v. Aluminum Co. of America, 167 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948) ; Leding v.
United States Rubber Co., 23 F.R.D. 220 (D. Mont. 1959); United States v. 50.34
Acres, 13 F.R.D. 19 (E.D.N.Y. 1952) (opinion by Judge Galston) ; Judge Byers' opin-
ion in the same case, 12 F.R.D. 440 (E.D.N.Y. 1952); Kendall v. United Airlines, 9
F.D.R. 702 (S.D.N.Y 1949); and Lewis v. United Air Lines, 31 F. Supp. 617 (WD.
Pa.), rehearing 32 F. Supp. 21 (1940).
187 E.g., Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 425 (N.D.
Ohio 1947) aff'd sub. wm. Sachs v. Aluminum Co. of America, supra note 186;
Bergstrom Paper Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 7 F.R.D. 548 (E.D. Wis. 1947). This
problem was considered in Boynton v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 36 F. Supp. 593
(D. Mass. 1941), but discovery was denied on other grounds.
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of the client.188 Even if the privilege extends to agents of the client
or the attorney, it is still limited to communications between them and
does not protect knowledge obtained by the agent aside from such
communication.8 9 Whether an expert can be compelled at trial to
answer an inquiry in the area of his expertise has been of more
concern.' The federal courts which have considered this problem
have concluded that the court has the right to compel answers to such
inquiries within the existing knowledge of the expert, but can not
compel an expert to make investigations or otherwise prepare himself
to testify.'
Once these two hurdles have been overcome, those decisions per-
mitting discovery in the area of expert opinions appear to proceed
from the premise that discovery simply advances the time of disclosure
from trial to the period preceding trial.'9 ' These opinions 9 were not
concerned with whether disclosure under the circumstances presented
would be unduly burdensome, annoying or oppressive either to a
witness or party. Discovery, however, is far broader in scope than
inquiry permitted at trial, and the power of the court to limit, con-
dition or prohibit disclosure is extensive and is not dependent upon
whether an inquiry would be proper at trial. Whether the dangers
which have been protected against in opinions refusing to permit
discovery in the area of expert information materialize in cases where
such discovery is permitted without limitation or condition will never
be known. Nevertheless, the fear of these dangers is real and arises
whenever discovery affords the opportunity to oppressively interfere
with trial preparation. When a case is in such posture, the possibility
exists that discovery is sought in bad faith or that annoyance or op-
pression to a party or witness will result from compelling disclosure.
As with a priori rules which have been the basis for denying prior
disclosure of expert evidence, requiring such disclosure on the ground
that discovery simply advances the time of disclosure is an oversimpli-
'88 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del.
1954) ; and United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 349 (D. Mass.
1950).
189 Ibid. See also Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert
Information, 14 STAN. L. REv. 455, 455-69 (1962).
190 See Boynton v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 36 F. Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1941);
Annot., 77 A.L.R2d 1182 (1961). The Washington court permits compelling such dis-
closure at trial. Sneddon v. Edwards, 53 Wn.2d 820, 823 (1959), and cases cited therein.
See notes 120-122 supra and accompanying text.
'l See Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1182 (1961) ; 4 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 168, 1 2624.
192 This view appears to have originated with Mr. Justice Murphy's opinion in
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
193 See cases cited, note 186, supra.
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fication of too broad scope. Such a view fails to meet the real issues
as they pertain to discovery of expert information. These issues
concern whether requiring such prior disclosure unduly burdens or
prejudices the witness or a party and the methods which should be
utilized to effect such prior disclosure without unduly burdening the
witness or party.
CONCLUSION
The concepts embodying judicial discretion and authority represent
the only valid answer yet offered to the varied problems which may
arise in determining the scope and extent of discovery, no more nor
less with experts than with other witnesses or evidence. These concepts
are vague and remain so after analysis of the decisions applying them.
Like standards of reasonableness that are common in the substantive
law, they derive a large measure of their usefulness from this very
vagueness, for they enable the district courts to achieve for each case
the advantages of prior disclosure without the evils uncontrolled dis-
covery could create. We thus have an adjustment by the courts rather
than a determination by deduction. This adjustment is not susceptible
to an accurate and scientific application according to precise and well
understood principles. Certainly the a priori rules which have been
used to solve the problems presented with discovery of expert infor-
mation do not withstand close scrutiny. The problem with which
district courts and attorneys should be concerned is not whether in
the circumstances presented in a given case discovery should be per-
mitted or denied, but rather, how can prior disclosure of expert
information be best accomplished and the issues narrowed and clarified
in good faith without oppression of either a party or witness.
Neither the opinion rule nor requiring a showing of necessity, as
that term has been used in the cases, has much merit as general
limitations upon discovery of expert information. These are seeds
left over from an earlier practice which have grown into the weeds
of a technicality frustrating the goals of discovery practice. The
rationale of the cases holding that such discovery is an unwarranted
interference with trial preparation has but limited validity when
applied to expert information. Such objections can be remedied by
limitation or condition without requiring denial of prior disclosure
of expert information. Unrestrained discovery of experts is an over-
simplification which fails to meet the issue. The keystone of discovery
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is its reciprocity. When the parties are in a similar position, discovery
should be encouraged; when they are not so situated, discovery should
be conditioned or limited so that the parties may equally obtain the
advantages discovery was designed to achieve.
Whether through pre-trial order,"" or a rule of court, when a dis-
covery issue is presented or when a case is set for trial, the court should
ascertain whether the parties intend to call expert witnesses. If so,
the court should order that the experts' investigations and studies be
completed in detailed written form 9 . by a specified date sufficiently
in advance of trial to permit discovery. The court may then provide,
on such conditions as the circumstances of each particular case war-
rant," 6 for the taking of the depositions of experts, for the exchange of
experts' reports 97 or for the taking of depositions after the exchange
of experts' reports. Such procedures are well within the courts' power
and are suggested as possible means to place the parties in a reciprocal
position so that the advantages of discovery may be mutually available.
Such procedures in the area of expert information will help to narrow
194 Freund, The Pleading and Pre-Trial of ans Anti-Trust Claim, 46 CORNELL L.Q.
555, 562 (1961) states, "Although not ordinarily considered to be a discovery device,
[a pretrial conference] frequently serves a fact finding function and may on occasion
supplant the more formal discovery methods."
195 It is essential that such reports be detailed for the opinions alone are of limited
value as is the underlying data without knowledge of the conclusions. What is neces-
sary is the support for the conclusions as well as the conclusions. Knowledge of the
underlying factual matter without knowledge of the conclusions are "mere stabs in the
dark." United Air Lines v. United States, 26 F.R.D. 213, 217 (D. Del. 1960).
196 If but $1,000.00 is involved in a condemnation case, certainly the extent of dis-
covery should not be the same as where the parties differ by $100,000.00 in their
estimates of just compensation.
Where a property has little relative value, condemnees are frequently forced to
accept a condemnor's offer whether or not it represents just compensation. It would
appear inequitable not to compel disclosure of the basis for such offers on condition
that the condemnee seeking such disclosure be refused the right to call expert witnesses
at the time of trial unless the interests of justice require modification of such condition.
It frequently happens that an appraiser of such a property, knowing a condemnee
cannot afford to go to trial, becomes careless and overlooks matters which should be
considered and which might well affect the estimate of just compensation. If a property
owner in such circumstances can show an ill considered estimate or that matters were
overlooked, the condenor might adjust its offer or the court might find that such con-
dition on discovery should be modified and permit an expert witness to be called by the
condemnee. Moreover, the risk of a low estimate based on partisanship might be modi-
fied if the appraiser knew his opinion and the support for it could be scrutinized in any
event.
197 The advance exchange of testimony in anti-trust litigation was urged in the
Prettyman Report, supra, note 167, at 70, which was adopted by the Judicial Conference
of the United States on September 26, 1951. See also Seminar on Practice and Pro-
cedure, 28 F.R.D. 37, 151 (1961). See note 182 supra setting out authorities urging or
requiring the exchange of certain data in condemnation cases. The exchange of ap-
praisal reports in condemnation cases has been required in both the Supreme Court for
New York County, New York, and the Supreme Court for Kings County, New York.
Searles and Raphael, Current Trends in the Law of Condemnation, 27 FoPDHAm
L. REV. 529 (1958-59).
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and clarify the issues and afford the opportunity for better trial
preparation, which in turn should shorten trials by confining the evi-
dence to the real issues, or afford the basis for intelligent settlement.
The same goals might be accomplished by other and different means,
for the courts' power is flexible. No solutions designed to attain the
goals of discovery have unvarying application.
Flexibility increases difficulty in the function of judge and attorney,
and emphasis upon discretion makes prediction of results difficult.
However, to effect pragmatically the result of mutual prior disclosure
of evidence in good faith, without annoyance or oppression, in each
individual case, is the way the rules contemplate the application of
discovery to effect the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
litigation as charged in Rule 1-again, no more or less with experts
than with other witnesses or evidence.
